This paper describes a spreadsheet-level model for analyzing attacks by a small, mixed collection of ICBMs, perhaps including decoys, on a set of targets individually defended by terminal ABMs. The central questions are how a fixed supply of ABMs should be divided up among the targets, and the resulting effectiveness of the optimized defense. All ABMs are assumed perfect in the sense that each ABM eliminates the reentry vehicle at which it is aimed. Since the ABM assignments are apparent to the attacker, he can "soak them up" by presenting the appropriate number of his least effective reentry vehicles to the subject target. The target is then vulnerable to any remaining "bangs" among the attackers. 
Introduction
As nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them by ballistic missiles proliferate (Feickert, 2004) , it becomes increasingly likely that a credible threat to use them might eventually be made or even carried out. Concern about this has led to various proposals for defense against small ICBM attacks, with anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) being the centerpiece. For example, on December 17, 2002, the President of the United States gave ABM development for such contingencies as a justification for withdrawing from the 1972 ABM treaty (Bush, 2002) . See Missile Defense Agency (2004) for an overview of the current United States ballistic missile defense program. This paper introduces a method for assessing the effectiveness of terminal ABMs that all ABMs are terminal, except possibly for a midcourse ABM system whose reach includes all targets, and which is also perfect.
To some extent, the mixed context justifies our assumption that ABMs are perfect, which is operationally equivalent to assuming that ABMs are sufficiently threatening that the attacker chooses to neutralize them with decoys or small RVs, rather than subjecting one of his more powerful RVs to possible intercept.
Even though the atmosphere is an ally in stripping away light decoys, it is still possible to design functional terminal decoys. Such decoys are heavy enough to displace other RVs, so the attacker has a payload tradeoff to make between firepower and dilution of terminal ABM defenses. This tradeoff is central to our problem.
General Analysis
Terminal ABMs must wait until incoming RVs are close to their targets before attempting an intercept. Operationally, "close" means that ABMs must be assigned to individual targets, with no possibility that an ABM assigned to one target can defend another. The attacker must similarly partition his forces, with the outcome at each target depending only on the forces assigned to that target.
The sequence in which the assignments are made, and the knowledge that each side has when making assignments, are crucial. Each side would, of course, prefer to make its assignments knowing the assignments that have already been made by the other.
The scenario most favorable to the defense is when the ABM force can examine the whole attack, all at once, before committing any ABMs. Given the difficulty of determining the attacker's ultimate intention when the first ICBM is launched, this assumption is rarely made. Our analysis here is based on the opposite assumption, where the physical deployment of ABMs is observable and reveals to the attacker the extent to which targets are being defended. The intermediate case where both sides must commit forces without knowing the other's intention is a kind of Blotto game (Washburn, 2003) that generally goes by the name of "pre-allocation" (Eckler and Burr, 1972; Bracken, et al, 1987) . In a preallocated defense, a secret but fixed number of interceptors is irrevocably committed to each target. If the number of attackers exceeds that number , then further interceptors are not committed, even if the command and control system would permit it. This seems unlikely when discussing a defense against small attacks.
Besides, Blotto analyses have been performed only for homogeneous attacking forces, and we have no useful generalization to offer.
When the attacker has the last move, the best that the defense can hope for is that his ABMs will eliminate the most powerful attacking weapons, one for one. If the defense also incorporates the idea that no attacking RV will be deliberately allowed to penetrate while the means of intercepting it are still available, as we assume to be the case, then the best that can be hoped for is that the ABMs will intercept the least effective RVs. The reason for this is that the attacker can always ensure that result by attacking each target at its known defense level, using the least effective RVs, before going on to attack the now undefended targets with more powerful RVs. The defense may be even less effective, since heavily defended targets may simply be ignored by the attacker while undefended or lightly defended targets are overwhelmed. In that case some ABMs might eliminate no attackers at all. We call situations where some ABMs are wasted in this manner "defense dominant", since they characterize the attack of a strong defense by a weak attacker. It is defense dominant situations that are our primary concern.
In the defense dominant case, it is natural for the defense to plan his ABM allocations in such a manner that the attacker sees no weak spots, in the sense that there are no targets where there is a large return per attacker. Such defenses are called PrimRead (Read, 1958; Karr, 1981; Burr, et al, 1985) defenses, for which there are well known optimal allocation methods when all attackers are identical. Our intention is to generalize this work so that the attackers can differ in terms of the amount of target killing power. Both CMP and EMT are cumulative measures; that is, the effectiveness of an arsenal is just the total effectiveness of the RVs composing it. During the Cold War, the arsenals of the United states and the Soviet Union differed strongly in these measures, with the United States (Soviet Union) having more CMP (EMT) (Current News, 1976) .
The most natural measure of power for a small attack is probably EMT, but we do not wish to be specific, so we refer in the sequel to a general cumulative measure called "bangs" that could be either EMT or CMP. However, a bang must be one thing or the other; that is, the target set cannot consist of a mixture of hard and soft targets. If the target set is mixed in that manner, then both the total EMT and CMP of the attacker's arsenal are important, and the method described below will not apply.
The attacker's arsenal is to be expended in attacking a collection of targets indexed by i, each of which has an associated value function V i (x) that represents "expected value killed if the target is undefended and attacked by x bangs". If target i is defended by d perfect ABMs, then the first d attacking RVs will be eliminated, and only the bangs associated with RVs in excess of d will affect the target. The first d attackers "soak up" the ABMs, so it is useful to think of each RV as possessing a single "soak", in addition to its bangs. Obviously, if the vehicles differ bangwise, then the attacker will use small ones (especially decoys) to soak up the defense. Since the defenses are assumed known when the attack is being optimized, our object is to calculate the minimum (over defenses) of the maximum (over attacks) of the total target value killed, or, more concisely, the min max value.
The numbers of ABMs and soaks are required to be integer-valued, but the number of bangs possessed by an RV can be any nonnegative number. Every RV has exactly one soak, but the number of bangs depends on the physical system of units in use -an RV with only .01 bangs might actually be very powerful. The total supply of bangs is assumed to be infinitely divisible, so that a given quantity of bangs can be distributed arbitrarily over the targets. This assumption makes most sense when there is a diversity of RVs, but is uniformly employed below without further inquiry into the question of diversity. In essence, once the set of targets at which the defenses have been soaked up is determined (this set automatically includes all undefended targets), the attacker is free to allocate the total bangs of all remaining RVs to that set of targets.
We first consider the case where only two types of RV are available to the attacker, one being decoys. The mix of RVs is subject to a linear payload constraint, but is otherwise determinable after the defense has been observed by the attacker. The constraint is b+λs≤B, where b and s are the number of bangs and soaks, respectively.
Parameter B is the total ICBM payload measured in bangs, and each decoy displaces λ bangs, where λ is some positive constant. We refer to this as the "free" case, since the attacker is assumed free to determine s (a nonnegative integer) and b (a nonnegative real number) after observing the defenses. We will then consider "constrained" problems where the attacking arsenal is a given, arbitrary mixture of vehicle types. The allocation of the attacking arsenal can be made after observing the defenses even in the constrained case, but the arsenal itself is considered fixed and known to the defense.
The following two examples of the free case illustrate the attack dominant and defense dominant cases.
Example 1: Suppose there are a small target and a large target, with the two value functions being V 1 (x) = (1 -exp( -x)) and V 2 (x) = 2(1 -exp( -x)). There are four ABMs, and the attacker is constrained by b + 0.5s ≤ 3. It is easy to show that the optimal defense is to use all four ABMs to defend the second target. Even knowing this distribution, the attacker should still soak up all four ABMs and use his remaining bang to achieve 1.285, splitting the bang (0.15, 0.85) between the two targets. If the attacker does not soak up all four ABMs, he can achieve at most 1 by attacking the first target.
If the attacker actually had six identical RVs with 0.5 bang each, then the best "split" of the bang remaining after soaking up the four ABMs would be to use the whole bang on target 2, this being better than the (0.5, 0.5) split achieved using one RV on each target. However, as mentioned earlier, we assume that bangs can be split arbitrarily among the targets, even in small examples such as this one.
Example 2: This is the same example except that B = 2; i.e., b + 0.5s ≤ 2.
Against the same defense, the attacker would ignore the second target, achieving 1 -exp( -2) = 0.865 on the first. The best defense is to assign 1 ABM to the first target and 3 to the second. The best attack is then on the second target, with the payoff being 2(1 -exp( -0.5)) = 0.787. This is the min max total value killed. Unlike example 1, this example is defense dominant because at least one defended target is not attacked when both sides allocate optimally.
General analysis of the free case
Let T be the set of targets, let D be the total number of ABMs, and let the min The problem of optimally allocating bangs when D = 0 is a separable, concave maximization problem. It closely resembles the search theory problem of allocating search effort to a set of places where a target might be, so a variety of efficient solution techniques is known (see Washburn(1981) , or more generally Ibaraki and Katoh (1988) ).
If S is any subset of the targets, let the maximum total value achievable with B bangs when the targets are undefended be V(S,B). For convenience, we define V(S,B)≡0 for
B<0.
If a target is defended by d ABMs, then the attacker should either soak up all d of them before applying bangs, or else ignore the target entirely. Therefore, once the set of targets to be attacked has been selected and the price of admission paid in soaks, the attacker faces the concave optimization problem described above. Formally, let I(S) be the number of interceptors assigned to target subset S. The function I() is to be chosen by the defense, subject only to the constraint that no more than D interceptors can be used in defending the whole target set T. Once the defense is committed, the attacker chooses a subset S to attack. Thus
Since the attacker is free to attack the entire target set, it follows from (1) that
M(B,D)≥V(T,B -λD)
, with equality holding in the attack dominant case. Theorem 1
gives circumstances where equality must hold. 
The function F i (r) exists and decreases from ∞ to 0 on the interval (0, ∞), as long as
is as specified in Theorem 1. We can now define the smallest return per bang that is permitted by an inventory of D ABMs when the cost of a soak is λ > 0: ,
where is the smallest integer that is not smaller than z; i.e., z rounded up. If the set over which the minimum is taken is empty, we take r(λ,D) = ∞. Since F i (r) approaches infinity monotonically as r approaches 0, a finite minimum will be found somewhere in Once r(λ,D) is obtained, the upper bound is obtained by multiplying by B:
This bound is 1.560 in example 1, or 1.040 in example 2, compared to the true values of 1.285 and 0.787.
Our contention is that the upper bound is only slightly larger than the true min max value in defense dominant problems where there are many targets of different types.
We have given little evidence of this so far, since 1.040 is not a particularly good With only a small total payload, say B = 1, the attacker has no choice but to attack one target by soaking up its ABM and then assigning 0.5 bangs, which is inefficient. On the other hand, the return per attacker is maximal when B is nearly a multiple of 1. 358, or when B is large enough to allow some flexibility in the number of targets attacked. Once B is large enough to make attacking all targets optimal, the defense is no longer dominant and the concavity of the value functions causes the return per attacker to begin decreasing, as in Figure 2 . The actual optimization problem faced by the attacker for a given defense is separable, but the presence of a defense complicates the solution because of the "buy-in" cost of soaking up the interceptors. A variety of methods are available (see Ibaraki and Katoh, 1988) for solving such problems, but, since our object is merely to show that the results of this optimization will be close to the upper bound when the defense is dominant, we content ourselves with (4).
Fixed Arsenal analysis
So far we have been assuming that the attacker is free, after observing the defense, to convert bangs into soaks at the rate λ. In this section, we assume instead that The attacker still has the problem of overcoming defenses, and should use the least powerful RVs, beginning with the decoys, to do so. A given RV can be used either for its bangs or its soaks, but not both, so there is a tradeoff between the two measures.
The efficient frontier can be shown as a concave relationship between bangs and soaks. Figure 3 shows such a diagram for the example above, together with one of many possible tangents. The point of tangency is one where the first 8 RVs are used as soaks, with the last two contributing 4 bangs. As before, we assume that the bangs can be distributed arbitrarily over the targets, even to more than 2 targets if the attacker desires. 
Formula 5 is the desired upper bound on the min max value in the constrained case.
Example 3: This is the same as example 1 except that there are three small and three large targets, D = 12, and the bang vector β is as given above and shown in Figure 3 .
The minimizing value for λ is 1, which corresponds to a defense where large ( 
An extended example of the free type
We consider here an extended example, assuming a defense dominant scenario with the United States being the defender. The threatened nuclear attack is to be entirely against urban areas, with the goal being to cause as many casualties as possible. We assume that each equivalent megaton will cover 58 km 2 lethally (SPARTA (2001)), so the attacker should seek to attack urban areas with a high population density. Table 1 shows the population and area of the five largest Continuously Built up
Urban Areas (CBUA) in the United States according to Demographia (2003) . We assume that the population is uniformly distributed over the stated area; that assumption is significantly wrong, but still sufficient for our purposes here. We also assume that all Assume first that there are 100 ABMs (D=100), and that the linear case applies.
Using (2) and (3) Angeles. Thus, the presence of ABMs has the effect of reducing the number of casualties per EMT available to the attacker. As λ decreases, the ABMs tend to be concentrated on the most vulnerable target, and the overall effect of the ABM defense decreases because it becomes increasingly easy to soak them up with decoys. The total number of casualties, of course, depends on the unspecified magnitude of the attack.
If λ is held constant at 0.5 while D is varied in the linear case, the dotted curve in Figure 4 results. By the time D=3000, the first 61 CBUAs are defended, rather than only the first 5. 
EMT ( 0.25 EMT).
The exponential case is shown by a solid line in Figure 4 . The linear and exponential value functions have the same initial slope, so both cases have the same maximum casualties per EMT when there are no ABMs. As the number of ABMs grows, so does the difference in casualty levels between the two cases. For any given level of interceptors, the attack is more spread out over CBUAs in the exponential case because of decreasing returns to the attacker at targets with high population density. The defense is spread out similarly; when D=100, fifteen cities are defended, as opposed to 5 in the linear case, and only 45 ABMs defend Los Angeles, as opposed to 64 in the linear case. Solid curve is the exponential case, dotted curve is the linear case.
The introduction of ABMs, even thousands of them, succeeds in lowering the attacker's return by only a factor of 2 or 3 over what it would be without them. This low effectiveness is not due to imperfections in the ABMs, since they have all been assumed to function perfectly. It is due, instead, to a profusion of attractive targets, together with the rule that (terminal) ABMs can only protect the target to which they are assigned. A layered defense that includes flexible, midcourse interceptors would be more effective, assuming that the midcourse interceptors could not themselves be easily decoyed.
In the free case, the ultimate (bound on the) damage caused by the attacker is Br(λ,D), which is of course proportional to B, the payload that attacks the terminal defenses. The effect of any midcourse interceptors is essentially subtractive on B.
Suppose, for example, that there are I midcourse interceptors, that effective midcourse decoys cost µ each in terms of payload, with µ presumably less than λ because exoatmospheric ABMs can be light, and that the initial payload is A. Then, assuming that the interceptors get soaked up by decoys, B = A -µI. Damage to the targets would be additionally reduced, of course, if midcourse interceptors could discriminate RVs from decoys, or even if they could attack RVs at random.
The reader who wishes to vary the assumptions made above, or to investigate the computations lying behind Figures 1-4 , may wish to download BangSoak.xls, a workbook available at http://diana.or.nps.navy.mil/~washburn/ . That workbook was used in making most of the computations reported above.
Summary
We have introduced a method for quickly approximating the effects of perfect terminal ABM systems against a mixed attack, under the assumption that the attacker is in control of which RVs are intercepted by the ABMs. The method is simple enough to be implemented in a spreadsheet. The effect of terminal defenses is highly dependent on the number of decoys present, or, in the free case, on the payload displaced by a decoy.
